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STATEMENT OF JORISDICTION AND 
NATDRE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case involves a civil action whereby a licensed 
electrical contractor, Glenn J. Mickelson dba Glen's Service 
Company (MICKELSON) brought suit in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, to recover on alternative theories of replevin and 
lien foreclosure, for labor and materials provided by MICKELSON 
in the construction of a commercial building, (the COMTEL 
BUILDING). After trial before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
judgment was granted in favor of the Respondent, MICKELSON, 
awarding the foreclosure of his mechanics lien against said real 
property, (COMTEL BUILDING), determining that the Respondent's 
mechanics lien is superior to the claims of Zions First National 
Bank (ZIONS) and Diehl Lumber and Transporation, Inc. (DIEHL). 
ZIONS appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(j) the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals from 
the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Per Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
the Appellant's issues raised are not made. 
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. §38-1-11 (1987): 
38-1-11. Enforcement - Time for - Lis Pendens -
Action for debt not affected. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for 
must be begun within twelve months after the 
completion of the original contract, or the 
suspension of work thereunder for a period of 
thirty days. Within the twelve months herein 
mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record 
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with the county recorder of each county in which 
the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of 
the action, in the manner provided in actions 
affecting the title or right to possession of real 
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to 
persons who have been made parties to the action 
and persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action, and the burden of proof 
shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming 
under him to show such actual knowledge. Nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to impair or 
affect the right of any person to whom a debt may 
be due for any work done or materials furnished to 
maintain a personal action to recover the same. 
U.C.A. §38-l-7(2)(e): 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting 
forth the following information: 
• • • 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his 
authorized agent, and the date signed. 
U.C.A. §38-1-3: 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien - What may be 
attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or renting 
any materials or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner and licensed architects and 
engineers and artisans who have furnished designes, 
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or 
who have rendered other like professional service, 
or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished or 
rented materials or equipment for the value of the 
service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or of any 
other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor or otherwise. This lien shall attach 
only to such interest as the owner may have in the 
property. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 14 
Rule 14. Third-party practice. 
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(a) When defendant may bring in third party. 
At any time after commencement of the action a 
defendant/ as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a 
summons and complaint to be served upon a person 
not a party to the action who is or may be liable 
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim 
against him. The third-party plaintiff need not 
obtain leave to make the service if he filed the 
third-party complaint not later than ten days after 
he serves his original answer. Otherwise he must 
obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties 
to the action. The person served with the summons 
and third-party complaint/ hereinafter called the 
third-party defendant/ shall make his defenses to 
the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in 
Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the 
third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against 
other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 
13. The third-party defendant may assert against 
the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party 
plaintiff has to plaintiff's claim. The 
third-party defendant may also assert any claim 
against the plaintiff arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the 
third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert 
any claim against the third-party defendant arising 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the 
third-party plaintiff/ and the third-party 
defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as 
provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and 
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party 
defendant may proceed under this rule against any 
person not a party to the action who is or may be 
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in 
the action against the third-party defendant. 
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. 
When a counterclaim is asserted against a 
plaintiff/ he may cause a third party to be brought 
in under circumstances which under this rule would 
entitled a defendant to do so. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 52(a) 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory juryf the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon/ and judgment shall 
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injuctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of 
its action. Request for findings are not necessary 
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for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion 
or memo-randum of decision filed by the court. The 
trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as 
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, 
issue a brief written statement of the ground for 
its decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is 
based on more than one ground. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 60(a) 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in 
judgment, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors therein arising from oversight or omission 
may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may 
be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the 
appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of 
the appellate court. 
Article 1, Sec. 7, Utah Consitution: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution: 
Section 1. Citizens of the United States. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves the determination of whether the 
Respondent, MICKELSON, an electrical subcontractor, is entitled 
to foreclose a mechanics lien against real property purchased by 
DIEHL from ZIONS First National Bank who acquired its interest 
through a trustee's sale by the construction lender. 
1 . This action involves generally the construction of a 
commercial building located at 57 West Vine Street, Murray, Utah, 
herein referred to as the "COMTEL BUILDING". (Findings of Fact 
1, Record 580.) 
2. The building was constructed by Heritage Corporation 
(HERITAGE) as owner and general contractor, for and on behalf of 
Comtel, Inc., the Lessee of the premises for whom the building 
was being constructed. (Findings of Fact 2, Record 580.) 
3. The construction financing was obtained by HERITAGE from 
American West Mortgage Corporation whose trust deed was recorded 
on March 29, 1985, and subsequently assigned to Far West Savings 
and Loan. (Findings of Fact 3, Record 580.) 
4. The Respondent, MICKELSON, was hired by HERITAGE to 
provide electrical materials, labor and equipment (in the 
construction of the COMTEL BUILDING) pursuant to a written 
subcontract with HERITAGE. (Findings of Fact 5, Record 580.) 
5. MICKELSON provided labor, materials, and equipment for 
the contruction and improvement of the COMTEL BUILDING from 
August 15, 1985, until June 10, 1986, at which time work was 
suspended by MICKELSON, based upon the fact that the 
Owner/General Contractor (HERITAGE) had failed to make payment of 
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the obligations due and owing. (Findings of Fact 6, Record 580.) 
6. That at the time of suspension of work on June 10, 1986, 
there remained due and owing to MICKELSON the sum of $27,026.46. 
(Findings of Fact 7, Record 580.) 
7. That on or about the 3rd day of June, 1986, the said 
mortgage lender, Far West Savings and Loan, filed its "Notice of 
Default and Election of Sale". (Findings of Fact 8, Record 581.) 
8. That on August 21, 1986, MICKELSON filed for record, his 
Notice of Lien. (Findings of Fact 9, Record 581.) 
9. On September 5, 1986, Far West Savings and Loan gave 
Notice of Trustee's Sale, scheduling the sale of the property for 
October 7, 1986. (Findings of Fact 10, Record 581.) 
10. On October 8, 1986, at Trustee's Sale, Zions First 
National Bank (ZIONS) purchased the interest of Far West Savings 
and Loan. (Findings of Fact 11, Record 581.) 
11. On October 27, 1986, DIEHL purchased the property 
(COMTEL BUILDING) from ZIONS, and thereby DIEHL claims to be the 
owner of the property (COMTEL BUILDING). (Findings of Fact 12, 
Record 581.) 
12. The construction of the COMTEL BUILDING was basically 
completed on July 17, 1986, except as to the work suspended for 
failure to pay. (Findings of Fact 13, Record 581.) 
13. Prior to the filing of the construction lender's 
(American West/Far West) trust deed on March 27, 1985, several 
subcontractors did work on the property. (Record 580.) 
14. In November 1984, the architect completed the "design 
development plot plans, floor plans, elevations and presentation 
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drawings". (Findings of Fact 14, Record 581.) 
15. Prior to January 16, 1985, DeMoss & Associates 
completed the boundary survey of the property and rough staking 
of the site for the building so that the leveling and excavation 
of the building site could be done by Bay Construction. 
(Findings of Fact 15, Record 581.) 
16. In January 1985, Bay Construction, pursuant to his 
agreement with HERITAGE, brought on to the project a large D-8 
Cat, with which he excavated and graded a "level platform" the 
approximate size of the building to rough grade, billing 
approximately $2,000.00 for his work completed. (Findings of 
Fact 17 and 18, Record 582.) 
17. HERITAGE intended the work to be the commencement of 
construction of the job. (Findings of Fact 19, Record 582.) 
18. On the date the construction lender (American West) 
rcorded its trust deed, the leveled platform for the building and 
the orange and yellow flagging placed by the surveyor, were 
clearly observable on the property. (Findings of Fact 20, Record 
582.) 
19. On June 12, 1987, MICKELSON filed his Verified 
Third-Party Complaint herein, seeking to foreclose his mechanics 
lien. (Findings of Fact 21, Record 582.) 
20. At the time of filing the Verified Third-Party 
Complaint, the Plaintiff verbally consented to granting of leave 
to file his Third-Party Complaint. (Letter from DIEHL's 
attorney, Randy Coke, Record 252.) 
21. That subsequently when the nunc pro tunc order was 
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presented to the Court, DIEHL's attorney reaffirmed that he had 
consented to the leave being granted in June 1987. (Record 252.) 
22. On November 25, 1987, the Court executed its Nunc Pro 
Tunc Order approving the filing of the Third-Party Complaint 
effective as of the date of filing on June 12, 1987. (Record 
251.) 
23. At the time of filing of the Third-Party Complaint on 
June 12, 1987, the only parties to the action were DIEHL and 
MICKELSON. All other parties were included as a result of the 
Third-Party Complaint. (Record 203.) 
24. The matters and issues tried and considered by the 
Court are claims alleged as alternative claims by MICKELSON in 
his Third-Party Complaint claiming: 
a. A valid lien on real property for labor and 
material furnished. The critical issue being priority of 
the claimed lien over the trust deed, which was foreclosed 
and the interest thereunder assigned to Third-Party 
Defendant, ZIONS. The date of commencement of construction 
being the dispositive issue, and Third-Party Plaintiff 
claiming that the commencement to do work or furnish 
materials as predating the date of recording of the trust 
deed, or 
b. A right to remove personal property (which is no 
longer relevant herein). (Findings of Fact 23, Record 583.) 
25. After a trial before the Court, the Court entered 
Judgment in favor of MICKELSON determining that MICKELSON's 
mechanics lien is a valid and legal lien, that the interests of 
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DIEHL and ZIONS is inferior and subordinate to MICKELSONfs lien 
and ordering the foreclosure of said lien pursuant to §38-1-17 of 
UCA, 1953, as amended. (Judgment - Record 586-588.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Respondent's arguments are summarized as follows: 
1 • Mickelson's lien foreclosure with respect to ZIONS was 
timely* It is clear from the findings of the Court, that 
MICKELSON suspended work on the COMTEL BUILDING on June 10, 1986 
(Findings of Fact 6, Record 580). Pursuant to §38-1-11, the 
action to foreclose a mechanics lien must COMMENCE within one 
year after work is suspended for a period of 30 days, or no later 
than July 9, 1987. The Third-Party Complaint commencing 
foreclosure was filed on June 12, 1987, well within the statutory 
filing period. 
2. Mickelson's lien foreclosure action with respect to 
DIEHL Lumber was timely. §38-1-11 UCA, 1953, as amended, 
requires that actions to enforce the liens must be begun within 
12 months after suspension of the work for a period of 30 days. 
The action to foreclose the lien was clearly begun within 12 
months after work was suspended for 30 days. DIEHL was a party 
to the action, represented by counsel, had a notice of the lien 
foreclosure action, and defended against it. The limitation 
period covered by §38-1-11 only requires that the action to 
foreclose must be begun within the 12 month period. DIEHL was a 
party to the action from the beginning, raising in its own 
Verified Amended Complaint the fact that MICKELSON claimed an 
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interest in the real property by virtue of his lien (Record 008). 
DIEHL defended vigorously against the lien, and is bound by the 
Judgment of Foreclosure. 
3. Mickelson's work was clearly lienable. Although 
MICKELSON alleged alternative theories of recovery he has 
testified only that part of the equipment he installed was 
removeable. MICKELSON testified he is a licensed electrical 
contractor (Record 628, p. 10, line 24), that he contracted to, 
and installed, all of the electrical work on the COMTEL BUILDING 
(Record 628, p. 14, line 18-22), that he completed the electrical 
work in the amount of $78,897.77, and after all payments, a 
balance remained of $27,026.46 (Record 628, p. 29-30, line 
15-22). He continued to do work until June 10, 1986, when he 
suspended work for non-payment (Record 628, page 37-38), and 
although some of the fixtures were removeable the bulk of the 
electrical materials were permanently attached in the building 
and clearly lienable, being a permanent improvement to the 
building contruction. 
4. The Utah Mechanics Lien statute is constitutional. It 
is clear under the provisions of the Utah mechanics lien statute, 
that even though a lien could be filed without stating an amount 
claimed, the clear procedural protections are afforded to the 
property owner. The filing of a lien does not "take" the 
property as do the prejudgment creditor remedies cited by the 
Appellant. In the case of mechanics liens, it is only a notice 
of lienor's claim, and in order to "take the property" a lawsuit 
must be filed, the owner served, and full trial on the merits be 
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held to protect the interests of both the owner and the lien 
claimant. 
However the mechanics lien statute is intended to protect 
laborers and materialmen who enhance the value of the property. 
It is not made in pursuance of any express requirement of the 
Constitution. 
The express provisions of §38-1-7(2)(e) provides that no 
acknowledgment or certification is required for any notice filed 
after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. MICKELSONfs 
lien was filed August 26, 1986. Inasmuch as the taking of 
property can only occur under the Utah lien statute, only after 
notice, recordation thereof, filing of a lawsuit, and trial on 
the merits, the statute clearly affords all the protections of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 7, of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LIEN FORECLOSDRE ACTION WITH 
RESPECT TO ZIONS WAS TIMELY. 
Under the clear provisions of §38-1-11: 
"Actions to enforce the liens herein provided 
for must be BEGUN within 12 months after 
completion of the original contract, or the 
suspension of work thereunder for a period of 
30 days." [Emphasis added.] 
There is no evidence whatsoever that MICKELSON's contract 
was ever completed, but only the clear testimony of both 
MICKELSON (Record 419) and Larry Bradshaw, (BRADSHAW), President 
of HERTITAGE, (Record 423) that work had been suspended by 
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MICKELSON on June 10, 1986, when HERITAGE'S financing failed to 
close as promised. Even after the last work invoiced and shown 
as being done on May 19, 1986, (Record 628, p. 36, line 1-10), 
MICKELSON received promise from HERITAGE that financing would 
close on June 10, 1986, (Record 628, p. 37, line 1-3). This was 
acknowledged by HERITAGE (Record 628, p. 160, line 6-15). 
MICKELSON continued to work on the project after May 19, 1986, 
doing various lienable work such as moving outlets, adding 
special outlets for a xerox machine, installing elbows and 
fittings on about 300 feet of underground conduit, installing 
cover plates, etc. (Record 628, p. 38, line 25-25). However, on 
June 10, 1986, when HERITAGE'S financing failed to close, 
MICKELSON suspended work on the project (Record 628, p. 39, line 
20-25 and p. 40). BRADSHAW (HERITAGE'S President) also affirmed 
the suspension of work by MICKELSON (Record 628, p. 161, line 
8-22) . 
Pursuant to §38-1-11, MICKELSON then had the choice to file 
an action to foreclose the lien one year after he suspended work 
for 30 days. The action had to be filed by July 9, 1987. 
On June 12, 1987, MICKELSON filed his Third-Party Complaint 
(Record 097), first contacting DIEHL's attorney (Randy Coke), the 
only other party in the action at that time, and having received 
his (Randy Coke's) agreement that he would not oppose a Motion 
for Leave to file (Record 252), the Court was so infomred. 
However the clerk inadvertently made a minute entry that the 
matter was continued without date (Record 126). Thereafter ZIONS 
was served and filed its Answer (Record 127). Inadvertently the 
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Order granting leave was not submitted to the Court until 
November when the oversight was discovered. Inasmuch as ZIONS 
was not a party to the action when the Third-Party Complaint was 
filed, the oversight was corrected by the Court, upon MICKELSON's 
request, and supported by the written letter of DIEHL's counsel, 
Randy Coke, verifying that in June of 1987, he had agreed that he 
would not oppose the motion (Record 252) and the Nunc Pro Tunc 
Order was signed on November 25, 1987, effective as of the date 
of filing - June 12, 1987. (Record 251) 
It is clear from the provisions of Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure that: 
"... the third-party plaintiff need not obtain 
leave to make the service if he files the 
third-party complaint not later than 10 days 
after he serves his original answer. 
Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon 
notice to all parties to the action." 
The Motion for Leave was filed with the Court on June 17, 
1987, and the only other party to the action (DIEHL) acknowledged 
that in June they had agreed not to oppose the motion. Only 
ZIONS has ever raised the issue, and since they were not a party 
to the action, had no standing to challenge the Court's granting 
leave to amend. 
Rule 60(a) makes clear that: 
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or 
other parts of the record and error therein 
arising from oversight or ommission may be 
corrected by the Court at any time of its own 
initiative, or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders." 
The courts of this state have recognized the inherent right 
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of a court to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct clerical 
errors. Frost v. District Court ex rel. Box Elder County 96 Utah 
106, 83 P2d. 737 (1938). 
The correction contemplated by subdivision (a) must be 
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of 
the Court and the parties. Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P2d. 401 (Utah 
1984). 
The nunc pro tunc order was entered to correctly reflect 
what had been intended in June by both the parties and the Court. 
The decisive issue as to the timeliness of the lien rests 
not when work was last done, but when MICKELSON suspended work. 
In the recent case of Mickelson v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P2d. 
561 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court rejected appellant's reasoning 
that a lien claimant must bring action within 12 months after 
suspension of "ANY WORK", concluding: 
"We do not subscribe to the trial court's 
interpretation of §38-1-11 because it runs 
contrary to this court's decision in Totorica 
v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P2d 984 (1965). 
In that case we interpreted the literal 
conjunctive language of the statute "that the 
action must be commenced within twelve months 
after the completion of the original contract 
OR the suspension of work thereunder for a 
period of thirty days" as affording the lien 
claimant a choice. That is to say "a lien 
claimant may bring an action within twelve 
months after the completion of his contract, 
or if he wishes, bring it within twelve months 
after there has been a suspension of work for 
a period of thirty days." 
MICKELSON's commencement of action was clearly timely, the 
Third-Party Defendant, ZIONS, was served and answered before the 
one year and 30 day period had expired. Whatever interest ZIONS 
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acquired at the Trustee's Sale was subordinate to MICKELSONfs 
lien. 
Appellant has incorrectly reasoned that the 12 month period 
for filing of the action must run from the last date of work as 
stated in the lien. That reasoning is clearly erroneous. The 
Supreme Court in Mickelson v. Craigco, Inc., supra, concluded 
that by the choice of the lien claimant he may elect to bring the 
action within 12 months after there has been a suspension of work 
for a period of 30 days. 
Even if the rationale of Appellant were accepted and June 
2nd or 3rd, 1986, was the date of suspension of work, 30 days 
suspension period expires July 1st or 2nd, and 12 months 
thereafter, the foreclosure action was already commenced. 
MICKELSON continued to provide labor and materials and fully 
intended to complete the contract until June 10, 1986, when work 
was suspended. It is clear that the work MICKELSON was 
performing was lienable work, within the meaning of UCA, 1953, as 
amended, §38-1-3, which states: 
"Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of 
any building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner .. • shall have a 
lien upon the property upon or concerning 
which they have rendered service, performed 
labor, or funished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise." 
In the case of Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P2d. 713 (Utah App. 1988), 
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the Court of Appeals concluded: 
"The purpose of the mechanics lien act is 
remedial in nature and seeks to provide 
protection to laborers and materialmen who 
have added directly to the value of the 
property of another by their materials or 
labor." Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 657 P2d 
922, 924 (Utah 1982). For work to add to the 
value of property, it is necessary that the 
work benefit the specific property in 
question." 
It appears from the testimony of both MICKELSON (T. 38, 91) 
and HERITAGE, that MICKELSON continued to do the work requested 
by HERITAGE or COMTEL, but authorized by HERITAGE (T.91 line 4) 
(T. 147-148). Appellant has argued that MICKELSON's suspension 
of work on June 10, 1986, was not a "suspension" because he did 
not return to work later (Appellant's Brief p. 18-19). However, 
it is clear from the undisputed testimony of both MICKELSON (T. 
) and the owner/general contractor, HERITAGE (T. 161, line 
20-22), that MICKELSON suspended work with the statement he would 
do no more work on the job "unless I get some money". (T. 161, 
line 22) 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "suspend" as: 
"to interrupt, to cause to cease for a 
time... 
also, sometimes, to discontinue or dispense 
with (permanently)..." 
At the time of suspension of work on June 10, 1986, 
MICKELSON made clear that his suspension was until he got paid 
for what was owed to him, so he could pay his suppliers. 
Inferentially, had HERITAGE paid him, MICKELSON would have 
returned to the job to complete the work. The evidence of that 
suspension was undisputed. 
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Even if the suspension date of June 10, 1986, was not 
correct, as Appellant argues, and the 30 days plus 12 month 
period ran from May 15, 1986, the action was still filed timely 
on June 12, 1987. 
Appellant raised the same claims before the trial court on 
two different motions for summary judgment and at trial, and the 
findings of the trial court were supported by substantial 
competent evidence that the suit to foreclose the mechanics lien 
was brought in time, and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P2d. 1 (1936). 
II, MICKELSON'S FORCLOSORE ACTION AGAINST 
DIEHL LUMBER WAS TIMELY, 
The same arguments of Point I heretofore, apply to DIEHL 
also. The only difference in ZIONS and DIEHL's position is that 
DIEHL was a party to the action from its inception, whereas ZIONS 
was added as a party through the Third-Party Complaint (Record 
97) 
The statute applicable to this point is §38-1-11 wherein it 
is provided: 
"actions to enforce the liens... must be begun 
within 12 months after completion of the 
original contract OR the suspension of work 
thereunder for a period of 30 days. 
...within the twelve months herein mentioned 
the lien claimant shall file fore 
record...notice of the pendency of the action 
... or the lien shall be void EXCEPT as to 
persons who have been made parties to the 
action AND PERSONS HAVING ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION..." [Emphasis 
added.] 
Not only has DIEHL had actual knowledge of Defendant's lien 
claim, but in DIEHL's own Complaint filed October 1986 (Record 2, 
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paragraph 4), it was alleged by DIEHL, that MICKELSON claims an 
interest in the property by virtue of a mechanics lien filed 
thereon. That allegation was admitted in MICKELSON1s Answer and 
put at issue thereby. 
Upon filing the Third-Party Complaint (Record 97) and 
serving ZIONS, ZIONS thereafter filed a motion for summary 
judgment to dismiss the lien foreclossure (Record 164) , and 
DIEHL's attorney, Randy Coke, was present and joined in the 
motion (Record 279, 328). 
Thereafter counsel for ZIONS has also represented DIEHL as 
well as ZIONS and in all subsequent motions and the trial, has 
vigorously defended the position of both ZIONS and DIEHL. 
On January 26, 1988, MICKELSON filed a Motion for Leave to 
Amend Counterclaim (Record 312) for the specific purpose to 
"conform the counterclaim to the issues raised", to include DIEHL 
as an interested party and not to commence foreclosure action. 
(Record 312) 
The foreclosure action had already commenced on June 12, 
1987 within the statutory period, the parties had been vigoroulsy 
contesting the foreclosure action, and the amendment was solely 
to clarify the record. Leave was granted in the sound discretion 
of the Court (Record 331). In the case of Buehner Block Co. v. 
Glegos, 6 Ut 2d 226, 310 P2d. 517 (1957) the Supreme Court stated 
at page 229: 
"notwithstanding all of our efforts to 
eliminate technicalities and liberalize 
procedure, we must not lose sight of the 
cardinal principal that under our system of 
justice, if an issue is to be tried, and a 
party's rights to be concluded with respect 
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thereto, he must have notice thereof and an 
opportunity to meet it." 
Appellant has again cited four cases (Appellant's Brief/ p. 
23) as authority that DIEHL should be dismissed. However in each 
of these cases the trial was concluded without the owner of 
record being included as a party. 
Appellant loses sight of the very fact they argue, ie. that 
a lien foreclosure action is an action against the property, an 
action in rem, not directed against people. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 16) It is that very reason why §38-1-11 requires only that 
the foreclosure "ACTIONS must be begun..." within the statutory 
period. Once the action has begun, individual parties must be 
brought in only if their rights are to be concluded. Buehner 
Block Co. v. Glegos, supra. The foreclosure action could 
proceed, but it simply could not conclude an individual's rights 
therein unless the individual has notice and opportunity to 
defend. Nothing in §38-1-11 requires that every individual must 
be named within the 12 month period. Accordingly the timeliness 
of the action depends only on when the foreclosure action is 
BEGUN. MICKELSON's lien action against the property is valid, 
and both DIEHL and ZIONS had notice and the opportunity to meet 
and defend their rights. 
III. MICKELSON'S WORK WAS LIENABLE. 
§38-1-3 UCA, 1953, as amended, gives a lien right to any 
person performing any services or furnishing or renting any 
materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
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premises in any manner. 
Without disputef MICKELSON provided labor and mateials for 
all of the electrical work on the COMTEL BUILDING, in the amount 
of $78/897.77 for which payment was made in the sum of 
$51f871.31f leaving a balance due and owing of $27,026.46. 
Appellants have apparently chosen not to appeal regarding 
the determination by the Court: 
"8. That the work performed on January 16, 
1985, by Bay Construction satisfied the 
requirement of the statute §38-1-5, UCA, 1953, 
as amended, as being the "commencement to do 
work or furnish materials on the ground for 
the structure or improvement•w (Record 584) 
The determination of whether work is lienable has been 
reviewed several times recently by this court. In the June 1986, 
case of Rotta v. Hawk, supra, this court was faced with a 
situation in which the contractor had two parcels of land on 
which to build. The evidence showed that he "removed" fill dirt 
from one lot to fill the other and then claimed that the removal 
of the dirt was lienable work. This court rejected the 
contractor's claim finding that the work on the lot from which 
dirt was removed did not benefit that lot and in fact acutally 
created a liability, requiring replacement of fill before 
construction could proceed. However the Court also concluded: 
"For work to add to the value of property, it 
is necessary that the work benefit the 
specific property in question. The work 
performed on Parcels A and B (from which the 
fill dirt was removed) would constitute an 
improvement, had it been done with the intent 
and purpose of benefiting the second project 
(Parcel A and B) from which fill was removed." 
[Parenthesis added.] 
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There is absolutely no evidence contrary to the evidence 
that all of MICKELSON's work benefited the property. Appellant 
argues that because MICKELSON plead an alternative theory of 
replevin, that makes the improvements not lienable. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 24-25) The Court rejected that claim and held that 
MICKELSON's: 
"•..title retaining agreement does not satisfy 
the requirements of the statute and no valid 
security interest was created by the same..." 
Even Defendant, DIEHL, argued to the Court that the 
"installations are fixtures under Utah law". (Record 35 and 37) 
In Bailey v. Call, 767 P2d. 138 (Utah App 1989), this Court 
concluded: 
"The mechanics lien statute is intended and 
designed to prevent the owners of land from 
taking the benefits of improvements placed on 
his property without paying for the labor and 
materials that went into them. Frehner v. 
Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424, P2d 466, 447 
(1967). The statute is to protect laborers 
and materialmen who enhance the value of 
property, and to effectuate that purpose, we 
construe the statute broadly. Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648, P2d, 1382, 
1386 (Utah 1982)." 
This Court then discussed and concluded that whether the 
work is authorized by the owner, or an agent of the owner, so 
long as it "enhances the value of the property", it is lienable. 
(Bailey v. Call, supra.) At no time has any evidence been 
presented to the trial court to question the fact that 
MICKELSON's labor and materials enhanced the value of the 
property, and in fact the building would be unuseable without it. 
The standard of review for findings of fact entered by a 
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trial court in a non-jury proceeding is set forth in Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) which provides in part as follows: 
"Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
MICKELSON's labor and materials enhanced the value of the 
property, were lienable, and the determination of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
IV. THE UTAH MECHANICS LIEN 
STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Appellant claims the Utah Mechanics Lien Statute is 
unconstitutional and to support that claim sets forth cases 
dealing with prejudgment remedies in which one's property is 
acutally taken. It is submitted that the question should address 
only the questions of: 
1) Does the filing of a "Notice of Lien" result in the 
"taking of property", and 
2) If so, does the Utah Mechanics Lien Statute provide the 
necessary constitutional safeguards. 
The cases cited by Appellant and dealing with prejudgment 
remedies are totally distinguishable and not applicable to filing 
of a lien notice. In the case of Rio Grande Lumber v. Darke, 50 
Ut 114, 167 P241, 1918 ALRA 1193 (1917), the Supreme Court stated 
that the Utah Mechanics Lien Law is not made in pursuance of any 
express requirement of the Constitution; but the law is 
nevertheless constitutional because the Constitution does not 
prohibit it. 
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Appellant has argued that even though MICKELSON's lien was 
"subscribed and sworn to," nevertheless the statute is 
unconstitutional because it did not specifically require the 
same. These requirements do not involve constitutional questions 
because the "owner" consents to the lien. 
A mechanics lien is purely a statutory lien and can only be 
imposed upon the owner's property where the owner, either in 
person or by his agent, CONSENTED to the work being done. 
(Bailey v. Call, supra.) Thus, the lien becomes a security for 
the payment for labor and materials, 53 Am Jur. 2d, Mechanics 
Liens §3) previously consented to by the owner (by authorizing 
the work to be done), a right to sell the property to which the 
lien attaches if the debt is not paid. It is clear in this case, 
HERITAGE was the owner/general contractor of the building (Record 
206) and consented to and contracted for MICKELSON to do the 
electrical work completed (Record 140-141). By the owner's 
consent to have the work performed, the subcontractor, MICKELSON 
was given a security right in the property, ie. a right to sell 
the property if the debt is not paid. 
Costanzo v. Stewart, 9 Ariz. App. 43, 453 P2d 526 (1969), 
Nolte v. Smith, 189 Calif. App. 2d 140, 11 Cal. Rptr. 261, 87 ALR 
2d 996, United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Martin & Luther General 
Contractors, 455 P2d 664 (Wyo. 1969). 
Accordingly, an owner having consented to the security 
(lien) cannot be deemed to have his property "taken", by the very 
act to which he consented. 
In a large majority of jurisdictions the courts have 
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determined that filing of a lien against real property does not 
constitute taking of significant property interests from either 
the property owner or the construction lender in violation of 
Fourtheenth Amendment due process. Bankers Trust v. El Paso 
Pre-Cast Co., 560 P2d 457 (Colo- 1977 ). 
Moreover the courts have held that the procedures serve the 
interests of prospective purchases of the property by providing 
them notice of potential claims against the property much like a 
lis pendens, which does not constitute "taking" subject to due 
process. 
The more sound reasoning concludes that even if filing of a 
lien creates an interest in real property, it does not 
unconstitutionally deprive owner of his property without due 
process of law, because filing of a mechanics lien does not 
result in the deprivation of any significant property interest, 
in that filing of a lien does not prevent owners from selling, 
encumbering, renting, or otherwise dealing with the property as 
he chooses. 
Carl A. Morse, Inc. (Diesel Constr. Div.) v. Rentar 
Industrial Development Corp., 56 A 2d 30, 391 NYS 2d 425 (1977); 
Red River Valley National Bank v. Craig, 181 US 548, 45 L Ed 994, 
21 S. Ct. 703; Drake Lumber Co. v. Paget Mortgage Co., 203 OR 66, 
274 P2d 804, (1954). 
The filing of a notice of lien is not a "taking" of property 
in violation of the constitutional due process provisions. It is 
solely a notice to those interested in the property, which, prior 
to foreclosure of said lien, must be fully reviewed by the courts 
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in the foreclosure action. If said action is not begun within 
the statutory period, said lien is deemed void (§38-1-11, UCA 
1953, as amended). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Findings of Fact entered by 
Judge Sawaya are supported by substantial competent evidence, and 
should not be disturbed (Bailey v. Call, supra) on appeal. Based 
upon those Findings of Fact, the trial court properly granted 
judgment allowing MICKELSON the right to foreclose his Mechanics 
Lien against the real property to allow him to recover for his 
unpaid labor and materials provided in the improvement and 
construction of said property, otherwise the owner would realize 
a "windfall" for the unpaid labor and materials. The trial 
courts decision should be affirmed. 
Inasmuch as the Mechanics Lien Law allows the lien claimant 
a reasonable attorney's fee, the Respondent prays also for 
additional attorney's fees and his costs as allowed under Rule 
34, of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1989. 
M. Richard Walker 
M. RICHARD WALKER & ASSOC. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Glenn Mickelson 
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